WPP

Marcoleta is RIGHT Remulla is WRONG: Restitution, Witness Protection, and the Limits of Executive Power

By: Anthony Ludalvi Vista

In September 23, 2025, Senator Rodante Marcoleta and Justice Secretary Jesus Crispin Remulla faced off during a Senate hearing on the Witness Protection Program (WPP). The clash was triggered by a real and pressing situation - 

A person involved in a corruption scheme was willing to testify against higher officials. He applied for admission to the WPP under Republic Act No. 6981, which guarantees security and benefits for witnesses. The sticking point was money. Because the applicant had received a share of the illegal funds, Remulla insisted that he should first return the stolen money as proof of good faith. Marcoleta objected. He argued that the law does not require restitution and that imposing it without a statute would be unlawful.

This dispute is not just about policy preferences. It strikes at the very core of the rule of law. May the executive impose a financial obligation on a citizen that Congress never required? Or must the law be applied strictly as written?

The Statutory Framework

The Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Act (RA 6981) governs the admission of witnesses into the program. Section 10 of the law lays out the requirements for a person who has taken part in a crime but seeks protection as a state witness. Among these are: that the testimony is absolutely necessary; that there is no other direct evidence available; that the testimony can be substantially corroborated; and that the witness is not the most guilty.

Restitution is not mentioned anywhere in the statute. Congress could have written it into the law, but it chose not to. Neither the implementing rules of the DOJ nor the law itself authorize the Secretary of Justice to demand repayment of money as a prerequisite for admission. Under the principle of legality, the executive must apply the statute as enacted, not add new conditions.

Restitution in Criminal Law

Restitution exists in Philippine law, but in a separate context. Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code provides that “every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.” Civil liability covers restitution, reparation, and indemnification. This is not a matter of executive discretion. It is part of the judicial process in a criminal case.

The Supreme Court has consistently treated restitution as a judicial function. In People v. Pantig (G.R. No. 143881, 2004), the Court held that restitution is an incident of civil liability and does not affect the criminal liability of the accused. In People v. Toring (G.R. No. 192601, 2013), the Court reiterated that restitution cannot substitute for criminal responsibility. These rulings confirm that restitution is ordered by courts, not imposed by the executive.

Restitution as a Judicial Function

The demand for restitution presupposes a finding of liability. Only courts, after proper trial and judgment, may order a person to return property or money. This principle is grounded in the 1987 Constitution, Article III, Section 1, which provides that no person shall be deprived of property without due process of law.

In Republic v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 213592, 2017), the Supreme Court stressed that even forfeiture of ill-gotten wealth must undergo judicial proceedings. The State cannot seize property without a court ruling. The same principle applies here: restitution cannot be forced by the DOJ as a condition of WPP eligibility.

If the Secretary of Justice demands restitution without a judgment, he effectively adjudicates property rights—a power reserved for the judiciary. This is unconstitutional. It would deprive a person of property without due process, reducing constitutional guarantees to mere words.

The Prematurity of Executive Restitution

Even assuming restitution is desirable, Remulla’s demand is premature. Restitution can only be ordered after a case has been filed, liability determined, and judgment rendered. To ask for restitution in advance of trial is to strip a person of property without any adjudication of guilt. This is equivalent to confiscation.

The analogy is clear: it is as if the executive is selling protection in exchange for property. The DOJ would be saying, “You may enter the program, but only if you first give up your money.” This transforms a statutory program into a transactional bargain not contemplated by law. It undermines the credibility of witness protection and chills potential witnesses who might otherwise come forward.

Strict Construction of Statutory Conditions

The Supreme Court has repeatedly ruled that statutory requirements for eligibility must be strictly followed. In People v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 107207, 1999), the Court emphasized that the qualifications of a state witness are exclusive and cannot be supplemented by considerations not found in the law. In Macalintal v. Commission on Elections (G.R. No. 157013, 2003), the Court made it clear that administrative interpretation cannot add to what the law has not provided.

These rulings underscore that the Secretary of Justice may not invent new prerequisites. If restitution is to be included, Congress must amend the statute. Until then, the DOJ is bound by the law as written.

Why Marcoleta Is Correct

Marcoleta’s position reflects fidelity to the Constitution and to the statute. He is correct that restitution is not an eligibility requirement under RA 6981. He is correct that only courts may impose restitution after due proceedings. And he is correct that to add restitution as a condition would deprive citizens of property without due process. His stance safeguards not only the rights of the witness but also the separation of powers that is the bedrock of constitutional governance.

Why Remulla’s Position Is Dangerous

Remulla’s position threatens constitutional order. It blurs the line between executive discretion and judicial function. It allows the executive to demand property without trial, in violation of due process. And it sets a precedent where executive officers can rewrite statutes according to personal standards of morality.

If this approach is allowed, the WPP ceases to be a program governed by law and becomes a tool of bargaining. It transforms witness protection from a statutory guarantee into an executive trade. That is a dangerous path, incompatible with the rule of law.

Conclusion

The dispute between Marcoleta and Remulla is not about semantics. It is about constitutional boundaries. The law on witness protection is clear: restitution is not a requirement for admission. Restitution is part of civil liability, but it can only be imposed by courts after trial and judgment. For the executive to demand it in advance violates due process and property rights under Article III of the Constitution.

Marcoleta is correct. Remulla’s interpretation, however moral in tone, has no basis in law or jurisprudence. It is premature, unconstitutional, and sets a precedent where executive officials can seize property by fiat. The rule of law demands better. If restitution is to be added as a requirement, Congress must say so, and the courts must adjudicate it. Until then, the Secretary of Justice must apply the law as written.